May 9, 2009, 11:36PM The "review" the White House and DoD have (partially) done is incomplete, in our view.
There are some "lessons learned from 9-11" that should have been coordinated. They were not.
Supposedly during 9-11, North American Defense Command (NORAD) was "aware" of things, but apparently "something fell through the cracks." This many years after 9-11, we should not have a repeat problem with failed coordination. The issue is less what management problems exist within the White House, but the larger issue of: "What other supposed lessons learned from 9-11 are still not fully implemented."
We hope the TPM reading community takes a step back from the newly released White House report, and focuses less on the DoD recommendations, but compare the system wide problems which supposedly happened during 9-11, and review to what extent those supposed "lessons" have or have not been fully implemented.
Of concern is the failure of senior US government officials, especially during wartime, for there to be a breakdown in coordination. Supposedly, we have a heightened terror-alert. By inference, if the public is subject to increased scrutinty, it is baffling to us in this corner of the blogosphere, how -- apparently -- a single Air Force Colonel would be expected to coordinate with the FAA, procure approvals, conduct the operation, and the White House only learn after the operation was over.
We'd like some more detailed emails, discussions, and other memos from the "post 9-11 era"; and compare how the "lessons of 9-11" were supposedly incorporated into US government wide checklists. It's one thing for the US law enforcement community to abuse American citizens because of the "concerns in the post 9-11 era"; but quite another to learn (again) that the US government is not fully applying the lessons during this supposed war on terror, a period of wartime. It is a secondary issue (but important factor) that the transportation system happened to be connected with the President.
We hope the public, as it has capably done after 9-11, review the supposed "failure modes during 9-11" and inquire into whether the supposed "lessons learned in the 9-11 report" have or have not been fully institutionalized. This review must include a review of the supposed notifications that were to go to the gang of four, the intelligence communities, and the commitee staffs in Congress.
We're not asking the US government to reveal operational details. Rather, we're asking the scope of the review over the Air Force One fly-by in New York City be given the appropriate attention, scope, and standing required. It is our view that there are important lessons in the 9-11 Commission Report which have not, this many years later, been fully incorporated into the notification, coordination, and full defense posture, planning, oversight, and decision making. This is somewhat troubling to publicly discuss because we are (supposedly) reviewing the operational plans, coordination timelines, and details decisions connected with the Joint Staff, NORAD, FAA, and operational combat-support units.
Last time we checked, Air Force One is the operational command post for the Commander in Chief. Similarly, during 9-11, there were problems with the coordination between then VP Cheney and then President Bush. We still have yet to understand why President Bush was apparently out of the loop, what VP Cheney was really doing. However, in light of the events last month over NYC, it appears the scope of the "coordination and communaition" problem that were -- supposedly -- addressed after 9-11, are still there.
We encourage the public closely monitor the public information about the fly over, and carefully compare how the findings, problems, recommendations do or do not square with what we've been led to believe were addressed after 9-11. It appears the US government along with state and local officials have spent quite a bit of time developing checklists, making plans, and coordinating things in the abtract; however, in practice, it is disappointing -- this many years after 9-11, and during wartime -- for these coordination issues to continue.
It does not appear the US government -- especially those connected with the events of 9-11, the reviews, or the 9-11 Commission -- have weighed in to accurately or correctly broaden the scope of the NYC fly-over. It's time for the public to pull out the lessons of 9-11, carefully review what we're learning about the recent fly over, and ask the following questions:
- Why are we not hearing a timely explanation about the supposed 9-11 lessons, and how these most recent fly-over occurred, despite the repeat "coordination" problems which plagued us as a "causal factor" before 9-11?
- To what extent has 9-11 been used as an excuse to expand power, but not a (needed) catalyst to ensure the operational responses, planning, and communication are resolved to ensure the communication problem "before 9-11" has been solved and does not continue?
- What did NORAD know about the Air Force One Fly over; and how does this "awareness" compare with (a) pre-9-11 event timelines; and (b) the supposed lessons learned-applied after 9-11?
The problem of 9-11 appears to have been an excuse to abuse power; but not the needed catalyst to ensure we resolve the real communication-coordination problems we supposedly experienced during 9-11. This bungling last month raises doubts about whether the national leadership really solved the right problem. This leadership is running out of time to provide the American public a credible explanation of what really went wrong on 9-11; or that the "solutions" to 9-11 have been implemented.
Things are not adding up. And the TPM community appears to be well poised to ask the right questions, and get to the bottom of this.
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